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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

CALDER BROTHERS CREAMERY
COMPANY, a corporation, and THE
COMMIS,SION OF FINANCE OF
UTAH, Administering The s,tate Insurance Fund,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.

7275

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and CHARLES M. JAME·S,

Diefendatnts.

DEFENDANT;S' BRIEF

The Industrial Commiesion of Utah, one of the defendants named herein, makes no exception to the statement of the case presented in the preface to Plaintiffs'
Brief; however, couns·el for the defendant Commission
present the following salient facts which appear o.f
record and which p~aintiffs neglect to comment upon.
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Charles Millard James, a resident of Vernal, Utah,
employed by Calder Brothers Creamery at Vernal, was
injured on November 6, 1939 at the hour of 8 A.M. He
was hospitaliz·ed at the Valley Hospital at Vernal where
he was treated for first., second and third degree hurns,
covering his entire face, neck, head, hands and arms to
the elbow (surgical re!port, p. 2 of Tr.). The /Valley
Hospital, through Joseph L. Hanson, M.D., reported on
about No¥ember 6, 19·39 that James suffered ''burnsmultip1.e, both arms· to above elbows, entire· face, ears,
neck, scalp and up·per thoracic region anterior; second
and third degree-moderately severe..'' (T·r. 4)
On January 24, 1940 Dr. F. G. Eskelson advised the
State· Insurance Fund:
''From the beginning Mr. James was in a
very critical condition. His burns are quite weJ!l
healed though there are some of the de·e per ones
t_hat are still cruste·d. He now looks the picture o.f
health, but due to the rheumatism which set in a
few we·eks after he received his burns, his arms
are absolute1y useless; we find it necessary to
feed him and care for him almost as a baby. * • •
1

"The dentist, as you know, is working on his
teeth and claims that within the next week or ten
days they will all be removed. * • *" (Tr. 5)
On or about June 6, 1941 the Medical Advisory Committee ·composed of Drs. J. A. Phipp·s, Fredrick Hicken
and U. R. Bryner examined Mr. James, the applicant for
worlrmen's compensation and the following appears of
record:
Q. ''The leg was lost years ago and the
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question 'vi1l arise 1ohether independently of
the leg he has a. pet"lnanent tot.al d~isability,
or will he be partially disabled from the hand
injury so as-or 'vill the hand injury be sufficient to n1ake hin1 a permanent total, or
'vill the leg be a ·factor in the picture~ * • *

A.

oon~pZ.ains of
sensah~on orer the

'• He

burning and a puckeritng
eyes, sjome burning of his
eyes. The rest of his face he does not complain of. He complains of inability to completely extend the right forearm. He complains of some paresthesia over the entire
right hand and inability to fully flex or fully
extend the fingers of the right hand, and he
is sensitive to cold. He has the same symp'toms only to a less degree on th·e left forearin and hand. He has been using a crutch
for 28 years because of an amputation of the
left leg at the thigh because of an accident.
"Examination of the applicant revea1s
that he cannot fully extend his right forearm, there being a loss of about 15 degrees
of extension. There are trophic changes of
the skin ov-er the entire right forearm, right
hand, and fingers. He holds his fingers in
a state of partial flexion of about ·20 degrees. There is swelling of the midphalangeal joints of the first, second, third, and
fourth fingers. There is atrophy of the soft
tissues over the two terminal joints of all
fingers, and he cannot flex the t'vo distal
phalanges more than a right angle. Re has
lost practically his entire function of grasp..
1ng.

''There is· a limitation iri motion and
abduction of the thumb and loss of apposition,
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and the sa1ne thing can he said of the left
extremity. Any fine manipulating type of
maneuver is out of the question.
''There is a loss of the left extremity
about a mid-thigh amputat~on. . The stump
is healed.
·
' 'Examination reveals that there is a
scar over the forehead, over the cheeks, that
there is a slight tendency to stenosis or narrowing of the mouth; that the mucus membrane is intact over the lips.. He has lost
som·e of his eyebrows; there is a little redness on the conjunctiva and midmargin. The
burns on the chest are well healed. There
is no sign of infection.
''As a result of this I think that his disa.bi1ity is fixed, and considering the loss of
his left leg and the r·esult of the injuries from
the _burns we feel that he has a total and a
permanent bodily disfunction; that he is
100% permanently disabled.
"Dr. Bryner: We feel that evien if this
man had his left leg normal and whole he
still w·ou.ld be 100% ·disabZed.
''Com. J ugler : You a11 concur'
"Dr. Phipps:
"Dr. Bryner:
(I talies added.)

Yes.
Yes." (Tr. 8, 9 and 10)

On June 19, 1941 the Commission advised the ap. .
plicant, Charles James, and the State Insurance Fund
that the. consulting doctors rated the applicant as having
permanent total disabl.lity and that he should have con1~
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pensation for the ren1ainder of his natural life. (Tr. 11)
· On June 27, 1948, repres·entatives of the Insurance
Fund investigated the situation and determined that in
view of the fact that Mr. James was employed as a
custodian and ticket taker by a theater in V ernai, a
hearing to make an adjustment was warranted pursuant
to the powers of the Commission, under section 42-1-72,
Utah Code Annotated 1943.
On July 23, 1943 Dr. Eskelson reported to the industrjal Commission :
'•This patient called on me today. His disab-ility ren~ains the same, nam·ely practically complete in both hands." (Tr. 12) (Italics added)
The Commission held a hearing on the 7th day of
October, 1948 in the City Hall of Vernal, Utah, wherein
Charles ~I. James was p·resent and testified as follows:
"Q. How much disability do you claim you have~
A.

If it came to makimg a livimg, maJYI!Ually, I
could not do it. I have worked for Mr.
Feltche at the auto court and the picture
show. He helps me out there, and on the
other job another fellow does the work I
can't do.'' (Tr. 33)

And further :
''Q. It is your hand and arms, do they both
bother you1

A.

I can't bend that way anymore than that.

Q.

We have to have it in the record.

~\)

A. The left hand and my fingers .. ·

~~

Q.

Your left hand and fingers are

stiff~
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A.

They are all stiff.

Q.

Difficult to flex your ·fingers and close into
a fist!

A.

Yes.

Q. How about the wrist movement; is the wrist
stiff'
A.

A little, but not much.

Q. Do you have good use of your 1eft handY
A. You can see how it is. I can't reach out and
pick up anything. It is hard to do.

Q. Do you have good use of your left 'elbow and
handt
A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you pick up a chisel with it~

A.

Not with my right hand.
as I can get my arm.

That is as high

Q. You have difficulty in raising it over your
head!
A.

Yes.

Q. We are trying to get this in the record, Mr.
James. What handicap do you suffer in
your hand~
A.

I can't grip anything. I can't pick up anything. I can't pick up a penny or a nickel
or a nail. I can't bend them.

Q.

How is the wrist 1

A.

The wrist bothers me.

Q.

And the

elbow~
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. .~.

.

Q~

.A..

Yes, and Iny shoulders .

. Both· bqther- you ·r .
Yes.

Q. Do you have good n1ovement in the elbow or
shoulder1
A.

No, sir.

Q·. Do you have good strength in your
A.

hand~

Haven't hardly any in the right hand.
3'5 and 3'6)

(Tr.

The r~ord further discloses :

'' Q. X ow you have some marks on your face and
neck.
·
A. Yes.

Q. Is that the result of' your injury. in 1939 ~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Doe! the injury on your face 'bother you from
eating or talking~
A.

Not too much.

Q. :Jiore disfigurement than a handicap in other
ways~

A. Yes.
Q.

Do you have any stiffn·ess in your neck' Or
in the movement of your head~

A.

I don't know how to explain that. I have
trouble. I don't know whether you call it
stiffness or getting out of joint; or what. It
does not bother n1e much. ·

Q.

Has that occurred since your

injury~
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Has any doctors ever told you what caus·ed
that¥
A. Caused when the vertebra gets out. I don't
know what it is.

.. .
~

Q.

Would you be able to g!o back to Calder
Brothers now and do the work that you did
before?

A. N·o, sir.
Q.

If you lost the job that you are working on,
do you think you would be able to find work?

A.

I would try.

Q.

I say, if you lost your job, do you think you
could obt:ain work1

A.

Well, I don't know whether I could or not.

Q.

You have not tried to get work'

A.

No." (Tr. 38 and 39) (Itali,cs added)

Francis Feltche, called as a witness before the Commission, testified that. he operated an auto court and
theater in Vernal and that Charles James was at that
time employed by him. Mr. Feltehe testified that he
has known James about 35 years (Tr. 43) and stated:
"A. He does janitor work at the theatre, and
takes tickets one night a week at the theatre,
and does just general work around the auto
court, light jobs such as taking care of watering the lawns. He can't m.ow the lawns because he can't handle a lawn n1ower, but more
or less overseeing and taking care of smaH
items.
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Q. Is he able to do his work .like a nor:mal P'erson would t

A. No.
Q. You consider he has some disability1
_.A...

Yes, I do.
'V11en Mr. Jan1es first started to work
he \vas approached about operating the nlachines, but his eyes would not stand that.
~think that is one phase you didn't bring out.
I lmo'"' he has some trouble with his eyes .
. A.s to his disability, there is a friendship.
We used to go to school together, atrtd I· tried
to give him a lift. He is more or less on his
own, and if he wants to he can g~o home and
rest. He does not have to hurry on the job.
It is understood that jobs that Chwrley oam
handle, he will do. I don't know whether
Charley could get .the same thimg any place
els.e or not.

Q. What is your opinion about that'
A. I rather doubt whether he could. We have
lived side by side when we were young, and
Charley's dependability is one of his chief
assets that he has.
If·

Q. You are at present show·ilng consi~derat~on fo·r
him because of his d'isablility?
·
A.

That is correct.

Q. Are you aware of any disability he is suffering in his eyes '
A. The ·fact that he was unable to operate machine·s at the thetttre on account of his eyes.
Q.

Were his eyes injured in the injury1
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A.. ·I could not say as to that. His whole face
was.
''Mr. 'Tan Campen: I think the record
shows there was no damage to them at the
. time." ('Tr. 44 and 45 )'
Compare the record which disc1oses that the Medical
Advisory Committee reported, ''He comp,lains of burning and a puckering sens·ation over the eyes, some burning of his eyes.'' ( Tr. 9) Mr. James was thereafter recalled and he then testified that his eyes were damaged;
that l;te was blinded for six weeks following the accident;
and that his ·eyes were injured in the accident. ('Tr. 46,
47 and 48). Based upon this evidence the Commission
found that Mr. James' present employment was due very
largely to a life-long friendship and that his permanent
total disability remained the same.

ASSE·RTION N·O. 1
EMPLOYMENT RECEIVED THROUGH SYMPATHY OR
FRIENDSHIP DOES NOT AFFECT APPLICANT'S RIGHT
TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS, ES.PEGIALLY WHERE WAGES ARE NOT ACTUALLY EARNED.

As set forth in Section 42-1-63, Utah Code Annotated 1943 and as quoted by plaintiff in its brief, the
law in effect at the time of the accident is in part as follows:
''In cases of permanent total disability the
award shall he 60% of the average weekly wages
for five years from date of injury, and thereafter
45% of such average weekly wages. until the death
of su~h person so to~1ly disabled, "" * •. ''
There is no exception for qualification to the per-
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manent total disability awards. There is no comp~arison
of average 'veekly 'vages before the accident and the
weekly wages earned thereafter.· The ·law requires the
insurer to pay a certain percentage of weekly wages until
the death of the insured. There is nothing in the record
which would indicate that the pern1anent total disability
of the applicant has changed or altered in any degree.
The facts presented will substantiate the decision of the
Conunission to the effect that James remained totally disabled.
The State Insurance Fund makes much of the fact
that the app1icant is receiving $160 per month from outside sources. This arrangement is referred to as an employment yet completely by-pass that portion of the
record which well establishes that Mr. Fletche carries
the applicant in his business because of a life-long friendship and the dependability of Mr. James. There is not
one iota of evidence which would indicate any possible
ability on the part of the api>'licant to hold down a job
requiring physical exertion. F1etche stated that Mr.
James can water the lawns but he cannot mow them. The
fact that James moves about with the aid of a crutch
may lead the plaintiff to conclude that Mr. James is a
strong man, but we submit that James could possibly
water the lawns by moving around on a wheel chair.
This court in the case of Cail~et vs. Industrial Commis.sion, 90 Utah 8, 58 Pac. (2d) 7'60, held:
· · 'Vhere ·the evidence conclusively shows that
ernployee is permanently and tot.a.J.ly disabled
from either se-curing or tp~erforming work of the
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general character that he was performing when
injured, he by such evi·de~~e establishes a prima
facie ell,se in the absence -of any showing that he
is able to ·secure and perfottrn; work of a spe-cial
nature not generally available, he is, as a matter
of law, entitled to an award as and for permanent
total disability." (Italics added)
The facts remain Mr. James would not be able to
secure employment in a dairy, working as a pipe fitter
or plumber because he is unalJle to use his hands to any
substantial degree.
In the c~se of Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co. v. Industrial Commission, 85 Utah 124, 38 Pac. (2) 766, it
was represented that the right to compensation should be
def·eated because the applicant, following the accident,
received $40 per month as a veteran from the United
States Gov-ernment and was treated in a government
hos·pital at Sheridan, Wyomi~g. This court stated:
''The statute provides that every employee
coming within the terms of the statute who is
injured by accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment wheresoever the injury occurred, unless the injury was purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled to receive and be paid
such compensation for loss sustained as shall be
awarded under the proceedings prescribed and
provided by the law a·p·plicable to the case. R.S.
Utah 1933, 42-l-43. As well argue that, if one
has separate income from savings or investments
or which friend$ p·ro-vide, or if annuities or pensions are paid to an injured or disabled employee,
no compensation:- should he allowed until such
sources of_ suppot·t, -maintenance, or_' relief are exhausted. Such is not the purpose of the statute.
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The purpose of the 8tatute is to reimburse the
injured en1ployee for loss of earning_ power, and
to provide for certain car·e and exp·ense~ within
the n1easure and amounts provided by the
statute." (Italics added)
Following the report of Standard Surety and Casualty Co. of New York vs. S~loan, 180 Tenn. 220, 173 S.W.
(2) 436, in 149 A.L.R. an interesting annotation commences at page 413. The annotation considers numerous
factors concerning the right to comp·ensation_ as affected
by elements occuring after the injury whereby an injured
employee earns, or is offered, or receives as a gratuity,
as much as or more than the income earned prior to the
IDJUry.
It is respectfully as·serted by counsel for the defendant that the weight of authority, in consideration of
the particular facts involved, well sup-ports the decision
of the Commission. This court repeatedly asserts that
sympathy has no part or proper standing 'before a court
of law. We expres·s our confidence in the fact that
symp,athy extended an injured employee will have no
standing to reduce insurance benefi,ts which are rightly
his as a matter of law.
The following appears in 149 A.L.R. 438:
''It is generally held that an injured employee
should not ·be denied ·compensation because he is
paid as much or more after the injury, where it is
~hown th~t such payment_ ts influenced by the
syn1pathy of the employer. for .the injured em. ploy~·e, o.r· is "in recognition _of. long s~rvices or
.s:pecial merits of the emp~oy~e. The theory behind this holding is ·that w-ages of this kind paid
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to the employee are not ·really earned hy him,
· since his ·services are not \Vorth as much in the
open labor market, but constitute, partly at least,
a mere gratuity. Also the employee cannot be
conl'pelled to accept the offer of the employer to
take him back at \vages which he is not a'ble to
earn. Sympathetic attitude toward an injured
emp~loyee is not -confined to the employer. In
some instances the employee has been able to
earn wages equa1 in amount to those received before his injury, only because of the help given him
by his fellow workers, he being unable to do the
work by himself. This is another form of gratuity
of which the injured employee is the recipient, and
the courts treat it, accordingly, in the same way
as they treat gratuities extended by the employer,
by holding that it does not preclude a claim for
compensation.''
In.Weinstock vs. United Cigar Stores, 137 Pa. Super.
Ct. 128, 8 Atl. ( 2) 7'99, the court held that the proper test
to be applied in determining whether or not an employee's injury entitled him to compensation for partial
disability, is the ·employee's abi[ity to earn wages in
the employment for which he is fitted. The case considered various elements in determining the ''earning
power'' of an injured employee, including the extent and
character of the physical injury or disability, his productivity or efficiency in the same emp~loyment as compared to what it was immediately prior to the injury and
his ability bo e~arn w.ages in any kind of employment.
In considering the facts involved the court stated:
"Claimant's duties as a sales manager required him to .supervis·e fourteen retail stores in
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Philadelphia, one in Camden and one in Atlantic
City. Before his injury he visited four or five
stores daily, inspecting stock and instructing the
salesn1en on Inethods of greater sales efficiency.
He also perforrned other duties relating to the
proper conduct of these stores. Before the injury he was able to do this supervisory work
alone. Since he returned to work his employer
has provided hiln with an assistant. The undisputed testilnony is that since the accident his
physical limitations have prevented him from
visiting more than one or two stores daily, and
more of his time is spent in the district office,
though his duties are the same. Before the injury
he " . . as paid at the rate of $3,100 a year and he
received his ~alary in full after the injury, during the period that he was totally disabled. On
his return to work in January, 1936 his annual
salary was actua'lly increased to $3,400. What he
received while he was unable to perform any services and his salary since he returned to work
were not paid to him in lieu of compensation.
''Defendant insurance carrier relies upon
Sayre v. Textile Mach. Works, 129 Pa. Super. 520,
195 A. 786, 788. Though that case and the case
under consideration in this ap~peal have some
elements in common, yet there ar,e material distinguishing differences. In the Sayre case it is
recognized that each case must be decided upon its
own facts and that there is no general rule of universal application. 'Prior decisions are controlling only when the facts are substantialiy identical
and the issue aroS'e in a similar way.' In that case
the question was raised after more than four
year~ of continued employment at a higher wage
and then in a proceeding· to set aside a final receipt. And the ultimate conclusion there, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
claimant suffered no loss of earning power, \Vas
based upon the fact that he actually earned the increased wages which he received.''

In Elliott vs. Gooch-Feed Mill Co., 147 Neb. 612, 24
N.W. (2.) ·561, the court considered an app[ication to recover additional compensation on the ground that the
applicant had not recovered from an injury for which
he had previously been awarded compensation. The
facts disclose that the applicant, following the injury,
could not return to his usual employment due to the injury causing !pain and weakness in his legs, shoulder and
back; yet thereafter he was employed in cutting and
trimming meat and in sorting eggs. On the new job he
was permitted to rest. The work required no strength,
lifting or agility and the job was a result of war emergency and faded out with the passing of the emergency.
The N ebras.ka court stated:
''In this connection it might be stated, 'For
workmen's comp-ensation purposes, 'total disability' does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, hut means disablement of an employee
to earn wag·es in the same kind of work, or a work
of a simi'lar nature, that he was trained for, or accustoined to perform, or any other kind of work
which a person of his mentality and attainments
could do.' Elliott v. Gooch Feed Mill Co., supra.''
In Chubb vs. Allegheny Country Club, 147 Pa. Super.
146, 24 Atl. (2) 550, the Pennsylvania court had an occasion to reconsider the ruling made in the Weinstock
case, supra. Chubb had _been employed by the Country
Club in a dual capacity of stable manager and riding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
instructor. He sustained injuries when thrown from
a horse which he was training, and as a result was never
again able to ride or train horses but had the ability to
manage the stable. The club employed Chubb at the
same wages as he had received before his injury. The
Commission found as a matter of fact that Chubb had
suffered, as a result of the accident, a ··50% diminution
in earning power but the insurance carrier contended,
since the Country Club had seen fit to pay Chubb the same
salary as before the accident, any award shoUld he suspended. The court held:
·'No new questions are involved under this
·braneh of the case. As there is an exp·ress finding, supported by competent evidence, that claimant since the accident has not actually ·earned the
wages he has been receiving through the generosity of his employer, the disposition of the case
at bar is governed by Weinstock v. United ·Cigar
Stores Co. et al., 137 Pa. Super. 128, 8 A. 2d
799, and not by Sayre v. T:exti1e Machine Works,
supra. 'Ve are of the opinion that the excep~tions
of the employer and its carrier to th·e action of the
board were properly dismissed. by the court below."
See also Beane vs. Vermont Marble Co., 115 Vt. 122,
52 Atl. (2) 784, where the court distinguishes and rationalizes the rulings of the various state courts with
consideration of the wording of p·articular workmen's
compensation statutes involved. The Vermont court
points out that in some states the basis is the loss of
earning power or the impairment of earning capacity.
Referring to the authorities and to the . section of the
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Public Laws of Vermont· involved, the court stated:
''The wording of P. L. 6527 is mandatory.
It is provided that at the termination of total
disability the employer shall p~ay compensation
to .the ·employee for certain specified periods.
This mandate is not made subject to any condi. tions or qualifiea tions here material. Thus our
statute has arbitrarily fixed the amount of compensation to be paid for scheduled specific injuries regardless of loss of present earning power.
This is the basis, as we have seen, for the holdings by the courts of Ohio and other states.
1

''The defendant says that the key word in
subs·ection XVIII is 'disability.' But the word
used is 'disabilities' which ve·ry apparently m·eans
physical disabilities and not disability in the sense
of loss of earning capacity. The defendant refers
to other se-ctions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in support of its claim that subsection
XVIII should be interpreted as allowing compensation only on a showing of disability to work.
But these sections specifically require that compensation be based on 'disability for work' (P.L.
s·ecs. 6521, 6'525) or 'diminished ahility to obtain
employment' ap·pearing in P.L. 6·485 defining partial disability as applied to disfigure·ment cases.
Moreover, 'disability' when used in respect to
scheduled specific injuries is not restricted to
such disability as impairs present earning power.
Buarhage v. Lee, 87 N.J.L. 36, 93 A. 859.''
In De·Kerlegand vs. Car & General Ins. Corp., - La. - - , 30 So. ( 2) 881, counsel for the insurer claimed
that the applicant, earning a high·er wage in a clerical
capacity, was riot entitled to. compensation for total disability; however the court held:
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'~It

cannot be doubted that the plaintiff in
the present case, due to his unfortunate injury,
\Vill never again be able to work as a 1ahorer in a
cotton gin. It is most unlikely that he is competent to perform duties requiring p·hysical effort
in any field of endeavor, and it is certain that he
can no longer eon1pete with able-bodied laborers
when seeking en1ployment. It is true that he is
now engag·ed in clerical work for another ·employer. But the duties of this employment are
less onerous than those demanded of a laborer,
and we are ·enjoined by the wel1 settled jurisp-rudence to hold that as DeKerlegand has been rendered incapable of doing work similar to that
""'"hich he performed in the cotton gin, he is permanently and totally disabled from doing work
of any reasonable character. The fact that his
earnings at this time are more than the wages
he received from the cotton gin is of no moment,
and does not d~prive him of his right to th·e permanent total disability benefits established by
the act. Butzman v. D'elta Shipbuilding Co., La.
App., 21 So. 2d 80; McKenzie v. Standard Motor
Car Co. et al., supra.
''The judgment appealed from is affirmed.''
See also Bajdek's case, 321 Mass. 325, 73 N.E. ( 2)
253; Rip~ey vs. Anderson Cotton Mills, 209 So. Carolina
401, 40 S.E. (2) 508; and V·ega vs. Higgins Industries,
- L a . - , 23 So. (2) 661.
In Vega vs. Higgins, supra, the ·plaintiff or applicant sustained injuries in the course of his employment as. a marine pipe fitter. Sometime following the
accident the employer engaged Vega for a period of 52
\Veeks, during which time he received his full wages
1
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~'Though

the evidence indicates that he did practically
nothing to justify the pay1uent of wages''; and thereafter Vega secured employment as a bar keeper where
he earned $40 per week. The court held :
''There is no douht that the plaintiff is unable to perform the duties of a marine pipe-fitter
and he is, therefore, entitled to recover under
this section of the statute.''
'The court made an allowance for credit for the 53
weeks during which time Vega had received ''wages''
from his ·employer. The court further he1d that V·ega
was entitled to the compensation as provided by the
statute, although employed as a bartender.
We respectfully submit that under the workmen's
comp~ensation act :of the State of Utah the amount of physical disability determines the right to benefits and the
amount of comp,ensation which an applicant will receive. By undisputed evidence Mr. James receives remuneration from his life-long friend-not for work performed and rendered, but for the sympathy of a friend
and the recognition· of dep-endability. We are certain
that ·counsel for the Insurance Fund will not attempt to
claim that Mr. James would be able to obtain similar
''employment'' or that hi! present favorable situation
would continue if Mr. Feltche were to sell ·the business
to a less sympathetic op~erator.
The record completely substantiates the finding of
the Commission to the effect that James continues permanently and tobi1ly disabled.
This court lias repeatedly held that even where evi-
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dence is conflicting, the findings of the Commission in
this ·regard will not be disturbed on app~eal. See Kelly
vs. Industrial Commis-sion, 80 Utah 73, 12 P~c. ( 2) 1112;
and Crow vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 33:3, 140
Pac. ( 2) 321, 148 A.L ..R. 3'16.
ASSERTIO·N NO. 2
THE COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO· MODIFY ITS
ORDER.

The State Insurance Fund argues that the Industrial
Commission's decision and order of Novemher 4, 1948
was a final order which the State Insurance Fund was entitled to have reviewed by the Supreme Court; and that
upon entry of the order of November 4, 1948 the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to amend
or modify its order of November 16, 1948. Counsel states
that the amended decision was a nullity. H·e must establish that position in order to be entitled to a Writ of
Certiorari from this court.
Section 42-1-65, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of
Utah 194J5 was relied upon by the ·Commission in its
order of November 4, 1948 in awarding the ap·plicant
additional compensation on the ground of the occurrence
of a disa;bility upon a disability.
In its petition for rehearing the State Insurance
Fund averred:
''The Commission's decision contains an
order that the State Insurance Fund shall continue to pay compensation tQ the applicant pre:-;tllnably for the· rest of his 1ife. · Such ari . order
can ·properly be ·made only wh~n the·· employee. is
perrnanently and totally -disabled as the result of
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the accidental injuries chargeable to the employer
and its insurance carrier. The Commission's decision contains a finding that the applicant is permanently and tota1ly disabled, hut it enumerates
the various injuries which caused him to be so disabled, one of which is the loss of his left leg in a
former injury.
''There is no provision in the W orlanen 's
·Compensation Law which allows an applicant to
receive payment of workmen's compensation benefits and receive payments from the Combined Injury Benefit Fund at the same tim·e, unless the
payments from the Combined Injury Benefit
Fund are for the purpose of rehabilitation. (Section 42-1-65). ·The Commission's decision did not
contain any mention or provision for payment for
training or rehabilitation of the applicant." (Tr.
20.and 21)
1

The Commission recognized its ·error and amended
its decision to the effect:
''The Industrial ·Commission now finds that the
applicant is still permanently and totally disabled bee (]fUse of injuries reoeived on November
6, 1939, i.e. partial loss of hearing, partial loss of
use of both of his hands, partial1.oss of vision and
stiffness in his shoulder and neck and bad scars
on his face, in adi!Jition to the loss of his left leg
near the hip due to a former injury.''
The findings are to the effect that Mr. James still
suffered disabilities from the explosion which caus·ed
him to he permanently totally disabled. The amending
order was not obJ.·ected to by the app·licant and was certainly not detrimental to the rights of the State Insur-
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ance Fund as the insurance carrier involved. In the
original order the Commission found: "The Industria~
Commission now finds that the applicant is still perInanently and totally disabled because of the injuries received on November 6, 1949," and "It is therefor~e ordered that the State Insurance Fund continue to pay
the compensation to the applicant as heretofore p~aid.''
The State Insurance Fund does not have control nor
jurisdiction over the Combined Injury Fund. It is administered by the Industrial Commission. Therefore an
order to pay an applicant from the Combin·ed Injury
Fund would not affect the rights of the State Insurance Fund. We, therefore, respectively submit that the·
authorities cited by counsel for ~plaintiff in his brief,
would not be controlling . in this situation since the
amended order would certainly relate back to the original
hearing and is not based upon any change in conditions
of the applicant. It was in effect a modification and
correction made in recognition of law. The defendant
Commission then as now, concedes that its original order
was in part void and recognizes that the assignment of
payment from the Combined Injury Fund to Mr. James
was a nullity.
In the case of Middlesex vs. Commissioner of State
P'olice, 128 Conn. 20, 20 Atl. (2) 412, it was held that an
administrative board or officer may review a decision
and revoke action duly taken if no change of condition
has occurred since the decision materially effecting the
merits of the matter before the board, and where no
vested rights have arisen. In Pickens vs. Workmen's
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Insurance Fund, 140 Pa. Super. 2:58, 13 Att 896, it was
held that the Workmen's Compensation Board of Pennsylvania is invested with sufficient authority to ,enter an
order nunc pro tunc. In the cas,e of In Re : Joe Brown
and ·Sions 273 Mich. 6·5·2, 263 N.W. 887, it was determined
that quasi-judicial hodies can, of their own motion, or
by request, correct or amend any order which is still
under their control without notice or hearing to interested parties, provided such parties cannot suffer by
reason of the correction or amendment.
CO·NCL,USION
We are primarily concerned in this case with the
right of Mr. James to continuHd comp·ensation, secondarily with the p~rocedure of the Industrial Commission.
We respectfully submit that in the findings P'receding the
first order and the amended decision, it was well estabJished that th·e continuation of benefits was justified
and hased upon the fact that the condition of Mr. J'am·es
had not changed as he continued to suffer permanent
total dis1tbility. The record certainly substantiates and
supports the findings and therefore we respectful~y submit that the award of the Industrial ·Commission should
not be reversed hy this honorable court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
A.t:torney General
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN
·Assist,an.t A'tiorney General
Attorneys for·Defenaant
Indrust'rial Commission of Utah
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